Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky dismissed Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov after the minister failed to complete three primary tasks assigned in January 2026, according to official statements and reports from Ukrainian media. The dismissal, which took effect in mid-July 2026, marks a significant shakeup in Ukraine’s defense leadership amid the ongoing war with Russia.
Zelensky publicly outlined three main objectives for Fedorov on January 30, 2026: closing the airspace and strengthening air defense, resolving the problem of forced mobilization and so-called «busification» (the practice of forcibly conscripting men from the streets), and launching a fully functional contract-based army model. While drone technology, artillery replacement, and cost reduction were mentioned separately, they were not listed among the top three priorities.
An assessment of Fedorov’s performance shows mixed results. The airspace was not fully closed, although the Ministry of Defense reported increased effectiveness in intercepting drones and cruise missiles. These figures, provided by Fedorov’s own team, require independent verification. Structural reform of the Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCC) remained incomplete at the time of his dismissal. One notable achievement was the automation of approximately 90% of deferrals through the «Reserve+» system, but this did not equate to a full reform of the TCC or an end to abuses during mobilization. The new contract system was only launched as a pilot project on June 15–16, 2026, with a timeline extending to 2028, making it premature to declare a fully operational contract army.
Fedorov’s focus shifted heavily toward technology and procurement. His final report listed 22 achievements, most of which related to drones, robotic systems, the Brave1 Market, combat scoring systems, equipment purchases, grants to manufacturers, long-range strikes, missile programs, defense exports, and artificial intelligence. Only one item addressed the transformation of service conditions and contracts. The TCC and the «busification» problem were not directly mentioned in the list of accomplishments. In a Telegram post, Fedorov stated that upon taking over the ministry without the necessary budget, his team redirected funds originally allocated for end-of-year cash allowances toward drones and other technological projects. This redistribution requires a separate financial audit to determine the legal basis, the amounts involved, and who made the decision.
The scale of the financial and technological infrastructure under Fedorov is substantial. According to official Ministry of Defense data, within less than a year, the Brave1 Market facilitated orders from over 400 units for equipment worth more than 33 billion hryvnias (approximately $900 million). More than 500,000 drones were ordered, and the catalog contained over 800 products. Payment and delivery are managed by the state through the DOT-Chain Defense system. Data from systems like DELTA and Mission Control are used to form centralized procurement needs. This infrastructure connects data on unit combat effectiveness, point accumulation, product selection, manufacturers, state payment, and future centralized purchases. While the existence of such a system does not indicate corruption, its scale necessitates audits of algorithms, conflicts of interest, manufacturer access, and the distribution of state funds.
Fedorov also publicly claimed credit for systemic military operations. His final report included achievements such as the «logistical lockdown» of the Russian army, the beginning of the isolation of Crimea, increased interception rates of aerial targets, Operation «Ashan» (which allegedly halted a mechanized offensive for six months), returning the initiative to Ukraine on the battlefield, and confirmed enemy losses and record results from drone units. These results, however, are the product of the General Staff, military command, Unmanned Systems Forces, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR), the Navy, specific units, and manufacturers, not just one minister. The question arises: where does legitimate ministerial reporting on created infrastructure end, and personal appropriation of military operation results begin? Answers would require comments from the General Staff, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, the command of the Unmanned Systems Forces, and Robert Brovdi «Magyar» on each disputed point.
The conflict escalated when Fedorov attempted to change the military leadership. On July 16, Fedorov publicly confirmed that he had proposed replacing Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi to President Zelensky. The president disagreed. After that, according to Fedorov, most ministry initiatives faced resistance, and the conflict ended with an ultimatum from the commander-in-chief. Fedorov acknowledged Syrskyi’s contributions to the defense of Kyiv, the Kharkiv operation, and the liberation of Kherson. This was not a rumor of personal animosity but a confirmed struggle over the direction of military policy and personnel control. The management decision appears to have been a choice between retaining the minister and preserving the existing command vertical of the army. According to sources from Ukrainska Pravda, the constant conflict between the Ministry of Defense and the military command was the main reason for not keeping Fedorov in the new government.
Fedorov’s final report, published on July 15 at 6:17 PM, served as the start of a media campaign. The 22-point post garnered millions of views. A separate text about what was not achieved appeared a minute later, ending with the phrase «To be continued.» A video was published at 7:13 PM. The dismissal of Fedorov, a key figure in Ukraine’s technological war effort, signals a potential shift in defense strategy, prioritizing traditional military command structures over the independent, tech-driven approach that characterized his tenure.
